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The Epistemic Significance of  
Aquinas’s Appeal to Doxastic Instinct
Mark Boespflug 
Aquinas’s conception of faith has been taken to involve believing in a way that 
is expressly out of keeping with the evidence. Rather than being produced by 
evidence, the confidence involved in faith is a product of the will’s decision. 
This causes Aquinas’s conception of faith to look flagrantly irrational. Herein, 
I offer an interpretation of Aquinas’s position on faith that has not been previ-
ously proposed. I point out that Aquinas responds to the threat of faith’s irra-
tionality by explicitly maintaining that one may reasonably believe by faith 
because of an instinct to believe. I go on to point out other instances in which 
instincts amount to legitimate epistemic grounds for Aquinas. Given that this 
dimension of Aquinas’s thought is not well developed, I close by introducing 
some extensions of it in the work of John Henry Newman as well as points 
of contrast.
“The general sense is [that faith is] belief, perhaps based on some evi-
dence, but very firm, or at least more firm, and/or of more extensive con-
tent, than the evidence possessed by the believer rationally warrants.”1 
Thus, John Hick succinctly articulated a concern that many share regard-
ing specifically a Thomistic conception of faith.2 It may be noticed that 
there are two problems here: one regarding degree of confidence outstrip-
ping evidence and another regarding content outstripping evidence. My 
focus will be on the problem of faith apparently involving a degree of 
confidence that outstrips the evidence.
Hick’s representation of faith seems to have considerable grounds in 
Thomas Aquinas. For Aquinas himself claims in De Veritate: “We can for-
mulate a rough definition [of faith], and say: faith is a habit of our mind, 
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
applyparastyle "fig" parastyle "Figure"
1Faith and Knowledge, 12.
2Dawes similarly finds there to be a significant tension between faith and a rational dox-
astic response. As he puts it: “Aquinas makes a clear distinction between reason and faith. 
. . . We must, it seems, either reason or believe. We cannot do both, at least not with regard to 
the same proposition” (“The Act of Faith: Aquinas and the Moderns,” 67).
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by which eternal life begins in us, and which makes our understanding 
assent to things which are not evident (inevidens).”3 This lack of eviden-
tia requires independent treatment and will be dealt with in some detail 
below;4 so, for now I will leave it untranslated. In any case, suffice it here 
to say that one can begin to see how Hick’s portrait of faith as inherently 
involving a confidence-evidence mismatch gets up and running. Further, 
in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas makes it clear that this lack of evidentia 
is not incidental to faith:
The believer’s intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees 
it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles, but because 
his will commands his intellect to assent . . . The intellect is convinced that 
it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not based on the 
evidence of the thing (per evidentia rei) . . . [If it were so based] the essence of 
faith would be taken away (ratio fidei tolleretur).5
What we learn, here, is that it is part of the very nature (ratio) of Thomistic 
faith to believe something that lacks evidentia, and, in its absence, the dox-
astic agent, consequently, comes to believe in virtue of an exercise of the 
will.6
The conception of faith wherein the will steps in to augment one’s con-
fidence or firmness of assent,7 rather than being an unfortunate and inci-
dental feature of Aquinas’s account, is crucial to it. This is because faith 
is a virtue and, as such, meritorious; if, then, one’s confidence was fixed 
by the evidence alone, choice and merit would be absent.8 Yet, when we 
find that the content of what is believed by faith warrants (Aquinas says 




6I, here, agree with those interpreters who take Aquinas to be a doxastic voluntarist—hold-
ing that belief is under the direct control of the will. (E.g., Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith; Stump, 
Aquinas; Grellard, De La Certitude Volontaire; Murphy, “Aquinas on Voluntary Beliefs”) The 
element of indirectness involved—i.e., the fact that Aquinas holds that the will commands 
the intellect to assent ST IIaIIae.2.1.ad 3—I do not take to be evidence that he is, in actuality, 
an indirect doxastic voluntarist. Holding as much would run against the received framework 
of immediacy/non-immediacy and directness/indirectness that has shaped the literature 
at least since Alston’s “An Internalist Externalism” and “The Deontological Conception of 
Epistemic Justification.”
7It is tempting to frame Aquinas’s position on faith in terms of degrees of credence, owing 
to his insistence that faith involves a greater firmness of assent, owing to the will’s interven-
tion, than it otherwise would have. E.g., “Consequently a man’s faith may be described as 
being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its greater certitude and 
firmness, and, in another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater prompti-
tude, devotion, or confidence.” (ST IIaIIae.5.4) Given, however, that it is unclear that he has 
precisely the same notion in mind, I will refer to faith as involving a distinctively elevated 
“confidence,” given that this nicely incorporates both the intellectual and volitional elements 
embedded in, for instance, the remark above.
8ST IIaIIae.2.9; De Veritate 14.2.
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that it is only in virtue of the will’s activity that one’s confidence is as firm 
as that of knowledge—it is difficult to see how there is not a serious threat 
to the rationality of faith.9
This, of course, is no new problem, even if the details have been 
expressed somewhat differently in the past. However, in this article, 
I point out a possible solution that, to my knowledge, has not been hith-
erto proposed as Aquinas’s preferred means of resolving the issue.10 This 
involves an appeal to a doxastic instinct—that is, an appeal to our natural 
belief forming processes; hence, I  refer to it as a naturalistic response.11 
Now, given that his expression of this solution remains largely undevel-
oped, I close by bringing in the work of John Henry Newman as a possi-
ble way of developing what was only incipient in Aquinas’s thought. For 
9ST IIaIIae.1.1.resp; De Veritate 14.2.
10While John Jenkins, in his Knowledge and Faith, discusses what he calls “the naturalist 
interpretation” of Aquinas’s conception of faith, which he views as endorsed by “[s]everal 
prominent contemporary philosophers of religion” (163), Terence Penelhum (“The Analysis 
of Faith”), John Hick (Faith and Knowledge), Alvin Plantinga (“Reason and Belief”), and Louis 
Pojman (Religious Belief) are among those mentioned. This sort of “naturalist interpretation,” 
however, turns out to be a substantively discrete position from the one I am advocating. On 
this view, the assent of faith is natural in the sense of natural theology: that is, faith is natural 
in the sense that “at least in the case of some persons” the belief involved in faith is the prod-
uct “of arguments from natural theology.” As will become clear below, I strongly agree with 
Jenkins that there are serious problems with interpreting Aquinas in this way.
My proposed interpretation is that faith is naturalistic in the epistemological sense. That is, 
faith, for Aquinas, is perhaps much like perception in that it amounts to a natural belief-form-
ing tendency. It’s worth noting that, while Jenkins numbers Plantinga (in his earlier work) 
as among those who take the theologically naturalist reading of Aquinas, my interpreta-
tion would be eminently congenial to the “extended” religious epistemological dimension 
of Plantinga’s proper functionalism. (Warranted Christian Belief, chpt. 8) Plantinga, however, 
appears not to have noticed Aquinas’s recourse to the doxastic instinct of faith, or at least not 
to have thought it epistemically significant.
Jenkins’s own interpretation, which he labels a “supernaturalist externalist” conception 
of faith (186), while certainly not terribly similar to my own, may possess some overlap with 
it, depending on Jenkins’s understanding of the “non-discursive intuition” that he claims 
leads one to hold that “the articles of faith [are] propositions to be believed on divine author-
ity and to which he should adhere in spite of considerations to the contrary,” (196). The 
view is externalist in that “the assent of faith” is ultimately “justified [in a] basic” way. I, 
however, do not regard Aquinas as taking faith to be justified in a basic way; for Aquinas 
claims that faith has “a sufficient motive (causam sufficienter inducentem) for believing,” (ST 
IIa.IIae.2:9) and that it is in virtue of this motive that one does not assent “shallowly” (leviter). 
See section 3.
Eleonore Stump offers a defense of the rationality of Aquinas’s conception of faith, 
responding to the objection that “faith [for Aquinas] is without epistemic justification” 
(Aquinas, 366). Stump offers a very different solution than the one proposed here. She 
appeals to Aquinas’s metaphysics of goodness in an attempt to defend the rationality of his 
conception of faith (367–369).
11Though epistemological naturalism is often represented as a fairly new phenomenon 
associated with Quine, Kornblith and Goldman, there is ample reason to hold that it has a 
rich history winding through the modern period back into the Middle Ages and, as I argue, 
is manifest in Aquinas himself. (See Boespflug, “Robert Holcot on Doxastic Voluntarism”)
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Newman explicitly offers a naturalistic defense of faith that is sophisti-
cated enough to possibly have been a large part of Wittgenstein’s inspira-
tion in On Certainty.12
1. Faith as Trust
I begin by pointing out that faith should be understood as exercising itself 
in trust, which involves belief, for Aquinas, but is not equivalent to it. 
More specifically, faith should be understood to be the disposition or habit 
of mind by which an individual trusts that a specific testimonial report is 
true.13 (Aquinas, apparently following Augustine, does not confine faith to 
the religious domain.)14
i. Credere as Trust
The first thing to highlight regarding faith is that credere (standardly trans-
lated “to believe”) is its act. (I leave credere untranslated here because I will 
presently challenge the standard translation.) Aquinas makes this clear in 
the way he puts the question that he will be addressing in article 1 of ques-
tion 2 in the Treatise on Faith in Summa Theologiae: “What is ‘to believe’ 
(credere), which is the internal act of faith?”15 Credere appears consistently 
throughout the Treatise on Faith in the Summa and De Veritate as the act of 
faith, so I won’t say anything more in service of this point here, except to 
note that this counts in favor of a voluntarist reading of Aquinas—that is, a 
reading that holds that believing is under one’s direct voluntary control.16
Now, I suggest that credere in Aquinas—and perhaps in late medieval 
philosophy more generally—is more appropriately translated “trust” or 
“to trust.”17 I’ll give four reasons in support. First, while it is tempting to 
think of credere as a propositional attitude of assent, this is not Aquinas’s 
view. Though he begins by following Augustine in IIaIIae.2.1 by character-
izing belief as something much like a propositional attitude—i.e., “thought 
with assent,” (cogitare cum assensus)—he ultimately regards this character-
ization as too broad. “If ‘to think’ be understood broadly . . . then ‘to think 
with assent,’ does not express completely what is meant by credere (non 
dicit totam rationem eius quod est credere): since, in this way, a man thinks 
with assent even when he considers what he knows by science.”18 Thus, 
it would seem that credere is a species of thought with assent, albeit not 
corresponding to the broader category of propositional attitude of assent.
12Pritchard, “Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason.”
13Having “faith in a particular individual” does not seem to run against the grain of this 
way of conceiving of faith, given that one may understand such faith to reduce to believing 
various specific propositions about that person.
14De Veritate 14.2; see my “Robert Holcot on Doxastic Voluntarism.”
15ST IIaIIae.2.1.
16See n.6 regarding positions on Aquinas’s doxastic voluntarism.
17I’m also inclined to say that the sense of “to believe” in early modern philosophy may be 
better understood as trust—and perhaps the same may be said about glaube in Kant.
18ST IIaIIae.2.1.
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Aquinas’s remark above brings up a second reason for regarding credere 
to be better translated “trust”—namely, that credere excludes scientia (or 
knowledge in the most strict sense) and vice versa, scientia excludes credere. 
In another remark he is more explicit about this: “It is impossible that one 
and the same thing should be believed and seen (visum) by the same per-
son. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an 
object of knowledge (scitum) and believed (creditum).”19 Again, if we were 
thinking about credere as a propositional attitude of assent, it would be 
very difficult to square this with the idea that high-grade epistemic states 
like scientia lack it. However, if we are conceiving of credere as “trust,” it 
makes perfect sense: it would seem that I cannot trust that p, while I know 
that p. And If I know that p, surely this excludes trusting that p.20
Third, credere is expressly held to be voluntary and subject to free 
choice. In addition to the remarks above, Aquinas’s discussions of faith 
are positively littered with this claim. Here is one example: “[Credere] is an 
act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will 
(ex imperio voluntatis) moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the 
free will in relation to God.”21 This appears to suggest that it is part of the 
essence (ratio) of credere to be voluntary, but, of course, very few philoso-
phers—including Aquinas it would seem—hold that assent or belief sim-
pliciter is voluntary. So, we seem to have yet another point of dissimilarity.
Finally, credere is associated with taking someone at their word or 
believing a testimonial report—whether this is a human agent or, as we’ll 
see, God.22 And when we believe someone, or take them at their word, 
this is often described as trusting that person. The act of faith, then, is to 
take on trust that a testimonial report regarding a specific proposition is 
true. Having this structure in mind will be important in what follows for 
assessing its rationality.
ii. Faith as Voluntary, Doxastic, and Regarding the Unseen
Now, it is also worth pointing out that taking trust to be both voluntary 
and doxastic is not a bad way of thinking about it. For it is eminently dif-
ficult to make sense of trust as involuntary. For if trust were involuntary, 
what are we to say of the regular practice of people asking one another to 
trust them? And how could there be imperatives to trust in certain cases?
But perhaps trust being voluntary is not a problem; perhaps, rather, 
maintaining that it is both voluntary and doxastic that is the problem. In 
order to avoid this conjunction, it is sometimes insisted that trust involves 
a merely sub-doxastic state like acceptance. But this generates serious dif-
ficulties. Suppose my wife asks me to trust her with a certain business 
venture she is engaging in, and I say that I will. Suppose, then, just for 
19ST IIaIIae.1.5; see also IIaIIae.2.5.
20Cf. substituting belief for trust in this context.
21ST IIaIIae.2.9; see also IIaIIae.4.2, IIaIIae.2.1.
22De Veritate 14.2
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confirmation she asks, “So you believe that I  can do this?” If I  were to 
respond, “No, I don’t believe you can do this, but I am willing to act as 
though you can,” she will not only be offended, but importantly, she 
will think that I have taken back what I just assured her of—namely, my 
trust. A different way of putting the same point is that thinking of trust 
as sub-doxastic can lead to something of a second-personal relative of a 
Moorean-style paradox—“I trust you that p, but I don’t believe you that 
p.” In any case, it seems that maintaining that trust is sub-doxastic is seri-
ously problematic. And aside from conceptual difficulties, Aquinas’s view 
would not fit with this way of understanding trust given that he expressly 
holds credere to involve a high degree of credence.
The last thing to say about credere as trust is that trust is required for 
faith because the content of faith is unseen. This is evidenced in what 
was the touchstone regarding faith for much of Christian tradition into 
the modern period, namely, Hebrews 11:1: “Now faith is the substance 
of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” Aquinas takes this 
verse to encapsulate faith’s essence; and one of the most important ele-
ments it involves is faith’s content being unseen. As he would put it, in 
faith, “The will, under the movement of this good—i.e., eternal blessed-
ness—proposes as worthy of assent something which is not evident (non 
apparens) to the natural understanding.”23
The important point that this reveals about faith is that there is a signifi-
cant misunderstanding regarding the content of faith not having evidence 
in its favor.24 When Aquinas and others claim that faith lacks evidentia or 
that its content is non apparens, it is merely because that content is not, in 
some sense, directly apprehended. For evidentia implies among other things 
a direct perception of the thing in question, via rational or sense faculties.25 
While what this means in terms of sense perception is straightforward 
enough, the classic case of a rational apprehension is a demonstrative 
syllogism. And even if it is allowed that such an argument could not be 
directly apprehended all at once as entirely self-evident,26 it is enough that 
the premises of such an argument have been grasped as self-evident along 
with the valid deductive structure of the argument.
Further, evidentia possesses the distinctive power to compel the intellect 
to assent. We find in the Summa Contra Gentiles that if the articles of faith 
were made evident to the intellect it would be “drawn necessarily (necessario 
23De Veritate 14.2. Though Aquinas uses non apparens in this context, it is fairly clear that he 
means to convey the same idea as in the quotation above from the IIaIIae—namely that faith 
involves believing what is not seen to be the case for oneself. (“We can formulate a rough defi-
nition [of faith], and say: faith is a habit of our mind, by which eternal life begins in us, and 
which makes our understanding assent to things which are not evident (inevidens).” (5.2))
24This misunderstanding is found not only among academic philosophers (E.g., Kitcher 
(2004); Dawes (2016)), it is also prevalent among popular science writers such as theoretical 
physicist Victor Stenger (2012), evolutionary geneticist Jerry Coyne (2015) and Sam Harris 
(2004). [the author needs to add these citations to the references list . . .]
25See, for instance, Pasnau, After Certainty, 32–35.
26This is what Pasnau calls the “Anselmian Glance.” (After Certainty, 94–115)
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tractus) to assenting to them.”27 Likewise, it is evidentia that famously leads 
demons to believe the articles of faith; they are compelled (compellantur,28 
coactus29) by evidentia to believe even against their will. Evidentia also gen-
erates certainty and is a necessary constituent of scientia. “The certainty 
of knowledge (scientia) and understanding (intellectus) comes from the 
evidentia of the things that are said to be certain.”30 Consequently, as with 
justification in contemporary epistemology, evidentia “is the all-important 
quality that distinguishes scientia from mere true belief.”31
What’s most important for present purposes is that, if a proposition 
lacks evidentia, this is not as serious an epistemic indictment as it would 
be to say that a proposition lacks evidence.32 For, we believe things all 
the time that we do not directly perceive to be the case for ourselves—
the existence of other countries, galaxies, facts about our plumbing, the 
quantity of money we have in the bank, parts in our car’s engine, and so 
forth—and surely we do so on good grounds, at least in many cases. And 
while it is difficult to say exactly what is meant by “evidence” in the con-
temporary milieu, it is something like a reason that increases or decreases 
the likelihood for a particular agent that a particular proposition is true. 
Thus, an absence of evidentia is perfectly compatible with a proposition’s 
still possessing “evidence,” and on its own, a lack of evidentia would seem 
to be no serious indictment of a particular belief.33
2.  The Reasons for Trusting
Now, one of the most important benefits of clarifying the nature of faith 
is that it helps to make clear what elements we should be focusing on in 
assessing its rationality. Identifying its ground as testimony should lead 
us to ask two questions:
(1) Whose testimony is it that one is trusting when one exercises faith, 
for Aquinas?
(2) What reasons does Aquinas think we have for regarding this testi-
mony to be true or reliable?34
27SCG 3.40.3.
28ST IIaIIae.5.2
29ST Ia.64.2; De Veritate 14.9.
30Super Sententiarum III.23.2.2.3c.
31Pasnau, After Certainty, 32.
32Though faith’s lack of evidentia is not as epistemically problematic as it has been taken to 
be, it should be clear from this section that there is a deep and principled distinction between 
the status of scientia and the status of things believed by faith. It is thus hard to understand 
how Richard Cross could maintain that there is a widely shared assumption “in the Middle 
Ages and beyond: that Christian faith must be as epistemically robust as scientific knowl-
edge” (“Testimony,” 37).
33John Jenkins helpfully makes much this same point. (Knowledge and Faith, 179)
34Those who take Aquinas to be an epistemic externalist of some stripe will doubtlessly 
not think this question quite as pressing. However, putting the issue of whether Aquinas is 
an internalist or externalist to one side, I will show below that he is eminently interested in 
precisely this question, and asks it himself in the Summa Theologiae’s Treatise on Faith.
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Though one might think that the answer to (1) is, for instance, one’s local 
parish priest or parents, Aquinas maintains that it is in fact the testimony 
of God that one believes in the case of faith: “In order that men might have 
knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for 
Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, 
as it were, by God Himself (traderentur quasi a Deo dicta) who cannot lie.”35 
The idea, as I  understand it, is that God—whether through Christ, the 
teachings of the apostles or the Old Testament prophets—spoke directly 
to human beings.36 Other human beings, in turn, have propagated that 
communication within the safekeeping of the Church and her authority. 
Yet, its source is, nonetheless, ultimately divine, given God’s involvement 
through the Church in the care of its transmission.
Now, Aquinas seems to be articulating an idea here that would make 
its way into modern Protestantism as well as the writings of, for instance, 
John Locke and Mary Astell: namely, that God is the source of religious 
testimony and given that God is trustworthy to the highest degree, such 
testimony warrants the characteristically high degree of credence involved 
in faith.37 But this only moves the critical question to a different level: what 
reason do we have to think this testimony ultimately came from God? 
Aquinas’s reasoning here is a little complex, but the general idea is that 
we are warranted in trusting that the testimony comes from God in virtue 
of the miraculous signs that accompany it.38 And he thinks that these are 
excellent evidence:
Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, 
in particular; and thus they cannot be seen (visum) and believed (creditum) at 
the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the com-
mon aspect of credibility (sub communi ratione credibilis); and in this way they 
are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidentness 
of the signs (evidentia signorum), or of something similar, he saw (videret) that 
they ought to be believed.39
Aquinas’s use of evidentia here is clearly loose and idiosyncratic, but he 
seems to mean that the miraculous signs are powerful supportive evi-
dence of God’s being behind the message, such that it is clear to the hearer 
that they ought to believe the report.
Now, a problem that readily springs to mind is that it would seem as 
though the miraculous signs themselves are believed by faith. And if this 
is so, it would seem to make Aquinas’s reasoning objectionably circular: 
I believe in the miraculous signs by faith, and I am warranted in having 
35ST IIaIIae.2.4.
36As will be seen below, Aquinas explicitly states that the certainty of faith depends on the 
epistemic features of communications to prophets. (IIaIIae.171.5; p. 11)
37Locke expresses this point in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (IV.xvi.17); 
Astell articulates it in her Serious Proposal to the Ladies (II.iii.104).
38This too is a position that Aquinas shares with Locke. (Essay IV.xvi.13–14)
39ST IIaIIae.1.4.ad2.
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faith because of the miraculous signs. This makes it pressing to get clear 
on just what the articles of faith are. According to IIaIIae.1.8, there are, in 
one sense, 14 propositions or articles—7 having to do with the Godhead 
in general and 7 having to do with Christ, in particular. Yet, in another 
sense—the object of faith is just one thing: namely, the “First Truth,” as 
Aquinas likes to put it, or God himself.40 This appears to be helpful for 
Aquinas, given that it means that none of the corroborating miracles are a 
part of what one initially believes by faith.
All that said, one might still see another serious problem looming. 
While this resolves one threat of circularity, it causes another to arise. 
When it is asked why the faithful are warranted in believing that the mira-
cles occurred, Aquinas’s answer seems to be that it is because the Church’s 
transmission of the testimony is safeguarded by God.41 However, this 
would suggest that the faithful believe that God exists and is safeguarding 
the testimony regarding miracles on the basis of that testimony. That is, 
one believes in God on the basis of a reliable transmission and one believes 
that the transmission is reliable because God is ensuring that it is. So, the 
circularity problem has not gone away, it has simply been reconfigured. 
Though this isn’t the traditional qualm with the medieval conception of 
faith, my sense is that it is perhaps the central one to come to grips with.
3.  Faith and Doxastic Instinct
The looming circularity seems to be a serious threat to how we were 
understanding the justificatory structure of Aquinas’s conception of faith. 
If one has no good reason to believe that the miraculous signs occurred, 
it would seem as though faith has lost its critical ground. This, in turn, 
would apparently confirm the original threat, namely, that faith involves 
a confidence that goes beyond the evidence. In determining Aquinas’s 
position on this issue, it is worth restating one of the objections he puts to 
himself in IIaIIae.2.9, where the question is, “Is faith meritorious?”:
He who assents to a point of faith, either has a sufficient motive (causam suf-
ficienter inducentem) for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient motive 
for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is 
no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he does not have a suf-
ficient motive for believing, this is a mark of shallowness (levitatis).42
Faith faces a dilemma: if one has a sufficient motive for believing, belief 
is compelled and hence not meritorious. But this, of course, would run 
afoul of faith’s being a virtue. Yet, if one does not have a sufficient motive, 
one is being intellectually shallow or believing with impropriety; one, it 
would seem, is committing an epistemic violation. What’s crucial for our 
purposes is that the dilemma conspicuously implies that the “motive” 
40ST IIaIIae.1.2.
41ST IIaIIae.2.6.ad 3.
42This is the third objection.
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the objection is concerned with is epistemic in nature. Consequently, in 
responding, Aquinas is attempting to isolate an adequate justificatory 
basis for faith.
In keeping with the interpretation of faith thus far given, Aquinas’s 
answer to this objection takes the first horn, maintaining that one does 
have a sufficient reason for believing.43
The believer has sufficient motive (inductivam) for believing, for he is moved 
by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles . . .44
This reply should be expected by this point, but if it turns out to be the 
whole story, it would seem as though Aquinas fails to extricate himself 
from the threat of circularity. Fortunately, it turns out not to be the whole 
story. For Aquinas goes on to identify a second motive:
. . . [The believer is moved], moreover, by the inward instinct of Divine invi-
tation (interior instinctu Dei invitantis): hence he does not believe shallowly 
(leviter).45
Thus, the believer has a more fundamental epistemic motive or ground for 
believing in Aquinas’s estimation. This is significant not only in that it is 
an accompanying ground further supporting the belief involved in faith, 
but it has the potential to break the vicious circle pointed out above. This 
is so because when Aquinas is pushed to address why the faithful are war-
ranted in believing that the articles of faith are ultimately the testimony of 
God, he points to this inward instinctus that putatively comes from God 
as a further ground.
Aquinas, unfortunately, does not expound on what precisely this 
instinctus amounts to or why it is epistemically significant. It is also unclear 
whether the English cognate “instinct” is the most appropriate transla-
tion. While “instinct” implies some impulse inherent to, or natural for, a 
creature, Aquinas insists that though the impulse comes from within, it 
is nonetheless divine or supernatural in origin. We find elsewhere that 
Aquinas associates the activity of the Holy Spirit with an instinctus: “to 
resist the instinct (instinctui) of the Holy Spirit is a grave sin.”46 This, again, 
suggests that the impulse involved is not properly characterized as fully 
inherent or natural.
Yet, Aquinas also carefully circumscribes a sense in which believing the 
articles of faith is natural in character even though it is the product of a 
43Aquinas’s explicit address of this point is very difficult to square with Cross’s externalist 
reading of Aquinas’s conception of faith (see Cross, “Testimony”). Jenkins’s interpretation, 
on the other hand, while externalist in a “supernatural” sense (Knowledge and Faith, 186), 





divinely given instinctus. In responding to the objection that faith is not 
natural, Aquinas claims that:
To have faith is not part of human nature [that is, it is a gift from God] but it 
is part of human nature that man’s mind should not thwart his inner instinct 
(non repugnet interior instinctui), and the outward preaching of the truth. 
Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.47
Even if the instinct to believe by way of faith is divinely given—and hence, 
in a sense, not natural—once the intellect does have such an instinct to 
believe, this means that the agent should not resist the belief that would be 
the natural output of it. That is, one ought to believe the proposition in ques-
tion on the basis of this divinely given impulse (once it has been implanted) 
just as one ought to follow one’s natural impulse to drink when thirsty.
A divine impulse or instinct appears on the scene again in Aquinas’s 
discussion of how the prophet knows his message:
[The prophet’s] position with regard to the things he knows (cognoscit) by 
instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully (ut non plene 
discernere possit) whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of 
his own spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not 
all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imper-
fect in the genus of prophecy.48
Nevertheless, such an instinct can, according to Aquinas, produce,
. . . the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express 
revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by God . . . 
Were he not certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the 
prophet would not be certain.49
The first part of the remark acknowledges that prophets are sometimes 
ambivalent about the source of their messages: does the message come 
from himself or from God? Yet, the same kind of impulse can apparently 
ground the highest certainty in virtue of it being the product of a God-
given instinct.50
Aquinas also identifies conscience as a kind of cognitive instinct: 
“Conscience is called spirit, that is, an instinct of our spirit.”51 And though 
Aquinas interestingly goes on to suggest that conscience is not a power in 
its own right—rather, it is a distinctive function of the power of natural 
judgment—conscience is able to produce beliefs that possess positive epis-
temic status. “Conscience is said to know (scire) something not in a proper 




50Though this suggests that we might interpret this instinct as playing an externalist role 
in justifying a belief in its output, and thus helpful to Cross’s interpretation, Cross himself 
does not appear to be aware of this thread in Aquinas’s thought. (“Testimony”)
51De Veritate 17.1.ad 8.
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predicated of that by which we know (secundum illum modum loquendi quo 
dicitur scire illud quo scimus).”52 Though this remark is rather obscure in 
that it appears to homunculize conscience, what’s important is that con-
science is a sub-faculty that naturally produces beliefs that are of good 
epistemic standing.53 And these beliefs possess good epistemic standing 
precisely in virtue of their being the product of an instinct, rather than 
being justified by further epistemic reason.
Instinctus is also used by Aquinas in a sense much more clearly in 
keeping with the English, “instinct”: namely, as the subrational impulse 
of animals. While humans make judgments about sensory particulars on 
the basis of something like reason (attingat rationem), “in other animals, 
since they do not reason, [such judgments] are from a natural instinct, 
which can grasp similar conceptions (ex instinctu naturali habet hujusmodi 
intentiones apprehendere); yet, this is not called reason, but estimation (aesti-
matio).” 54 This is not to say that judgments that are the product of instinct 
are irrational; rather, they are simply not the product of a discursive pro-
cess. For reason, in the strict sense, “operates discursively moving from 
one thing to another.”55 This is certainly not what instinct does; yet, this is 
no indictment of its rationality. For the aforementioned instinctus would 
seem to be productive of epistemically valid judgments in many cases. 
Thus, even if instinctive judgments are not based on some further reason, 
such judgments are appropriately based on the instinct or impulse itself.
The important point is that Aquinas takes the beliefs which are the 
output of faith to possess an independent epistemic ground—namely, 
a divinely given instinct or impulse. Much the same sort of impulse is 
operative in the case of prophecy as well as the case of conscience; and in 
each case the impulses or instincts are capable of producing beliefs that 
possess positive epistemic status. And such a position would seem to be 
exactly what one might expect of doxastic agents designed by a benev-
olent Creator, even if Aquinas himself does not put it this way. In much 
the same way that humans and animals can trust their instincts to avoid 
tissue damage, so can we trust our instincts to acquire doxastic states.56 
52Ibid.
53Again, this passage has a rather strong externalist sense to it; yet, given Aquinas’s ear-
lier remarks about instinct giving us an apparently internally accessible reason to believe, 
I will not take a stand on whether Aquinas’s treatment of instinct suggests anything one way 
or the other concerning his commitment to internalism or externalism.
54Super Sent., lib. 3 d. 26 q. 1 a. 2 co.
55ST Ia.59.1.ad 1; Hobbes, too, appears to have this sense of reason in mind in the 
Leviathan’s treatment of reason: “The use and end of reason is not finding of the sum and 
truth of one or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions and settled significations 
of names, but to begin at these, and proceed from one consequence to another.” (I.v.4)
56This reading of Aquinas should be somewhat reminiscent of Plantinga’s famous appro-
priation of him in Warranted Christian Belief (2000). At the same time, there are certain important 
differences that should be apparent. Moreover, Plantinga does not make use of the important 
role belief-forming instincts play in Aquinas. This, I expect, would have been of substantial 
interest to him and viewed as supportive of his theory of how theistic belief is warranted.
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The important difference in the case of faith is that, as noted, the instinct 
is divinely given, and so is not natural in a thoroughgoing sense, even if 
it is natural in the sense that it is “part of human nature that man’s mind 
should not thwart his inner instinct.”57 What is key for our purposes is that 
the motive (inductivam) that underwrites the epistemic legitimacy of faith 
is not a set of independent reasons, but the fact that faith is the product of 
an interior impulse.
4.  Newman’s on Faith and Doxastic Instinct
Now, one might be deeply unimpressed by Aquinas’s appeal to doxastic 
instincts as guides for believing, especially as an explanation for why faith 
is rational. “Surely,” the objection would run, “the irrational among us 
believe on the basis of their natural impulses all the time! That’s the problem!” 
So, why should we think this is anything other than a tendentious appeal?
In order to address this objection, I am going to draw from another 
catholic thinker, who seems to have developed much the same idea 
found in Aquinas. This is John Henry Newman. Though Newman’s 
position ends up being distinct in an important respect, the two share 
a remarkable amount of ground in how they conceive of the justifica-
tion of religious faith. However, I’ll connect some historical dots before 
proceeding. One such connection is that Newman was an admirer of 
Thomas Reid and Reid’s naturalistic response to Hume’s skepticism. 
That response can be construed in the following way: suppose that 
Hume, so to speak, won, in having shown that there is no good reason 
to trust some (or all) of our cognitive faculties. “Very well,” says Reid, 
“but we must believe on the basis of them nonetheless, for we cannot do 
otherwise.” Behold our natural tendencies or instincts to form beliefs on 
the basis of perception, memory, reason, and testimony—and how these 
instincts keep us alive in the street, even if we don a skeptical attitude 
in the armchair.58
Newman’s embrace of this naturalistic response to skepticism is not 
only apparent in some of his more prominent Oxford sermons and his 
magnum opus the Grammar of Assent, it would later have an enormous 
influence inasmuch as it was a source of inspiration for Wittgenstein’s 
fideism (or quasi-fideism) as well as Crispin Wright’s related view.59 The 
inspiration for Wittgenstein’s famed “hinge propositions” is Newman’s 
57ST IIaIIae.10.1.
58It is a common misconception that Reid’s famed principle of credulity is first and foremost 
an epistemic principle (Inquiry 6.24). Instead, it is first and foremost a principle in the sense 
that the law of gravity is a principle. Doxastic agents have a natural tendency to believe 
testimony; it is this descriptive or psychological claim about human nature that ultimately 
vindicates the secondary sense of the principle, namely, as an epistemic norm that we ought 
to abide by. See Boespflug, “Why Reid was no Dogmatist,” Rysiew, “Reid and Epistemic 
Naturalism,” and Mounce, Hume’s Naturalism.
59Pritchard, “Faith and Reason” and “Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason.”
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“antecedent probabilities” which will make an appearance in his 
remarks below.
To begin, here is Newman’s expression of the challenge to faith’s 
rationality as it appears in his sermon, “The Nature of Faith in Relation 
to Reason”:
The act of Faith is sole and elementary, and complete in itself, and depends 
on no process of mind previous to it: and this doctrine is borne out by the 
common opinion of men, who, though they contrast Faith and Reason, yet 
rather consider Faith to be weak Reason, than a moral quality or act follow-
ing upon Reason.60
That is, most individuals—including the faithful, it would appear, for 
Newman—regard faith as being in tension with the exercise of reason. Or, 
to put the point somewhat differently, faith is not based on independent 
reasons.
Newman takes the apostle Paul to exemplify treating faith as inde-
pendent of, or not needing, other reasons in support of it. For Paul did 
not corroborate his own report of Christ’s resurrection with more miracles 
but, rather, with “very like the evidence given to the mass of men now, 
or rather not so much.” That is, Paul did not give much in the way of 
independent considerations to support his pronouncements. Instead, Paul 
expected the “antecedent probability of a Revelation [to] be estimated var-
iously according to the desire of it existing in each breast.”61 Newman goes 
on to say that, “This instance, then seems very full to justify the view of 
Faith which I have been taking, that it is an act of Reason, but of what the 
world would call weak, bad, or insufficient Reason; and that because it 
rests on presumption more, and on evidence less.”
So, we have roughly the same situation as with Aquinas: the original 
message of Christ is corroborated by miracles; yet, its subsequent trans-
mitters (e.g., Paul) are mere authorities not underwritten by miracles 
themselves. Faith, then, looks to be epistemically ungrounded, at least 
inasmuch as the original miracles are not able to do the requisite justifi-
catory work by themselves. Yet, the Apostle’s approach to eliciting faith 
is instructive inasmuch as it does not rely upon marshalling further evi-
dence, but aims to activate a certain internal disposition to believe. This 
disposition Newman will call instinct.
The novelty of Newman’s conception of faith as epistemically grounded 
in doxastic instinct consists especially in the parallels he draws to other 
sources of belief or knowledge. After allowing that we have no independ-
ent grounds for faith, he claims that the same is true of these other sources:
Whether we consider processes of Faith or other exercise of Reason, men 
advance forward on ground which they do not, or cannot produce, or if 
they could, yet, could not prove to be true, on latent or antecedent grounds 
60The Genius of John Henry Newman, 48.
61The Genius of John Henry Newman, 48–49.
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which they take for granted . . . However clear and tangible our evidence, 
yet when our argument is traced down to its simple elements, there must 
ever be something assumed ultimately which is incapable of proof, and 
without which our conclusion will be as illogical as faith is apt to seem to 
men of the world.62
Yet Newman, like Reid, nevertheless thinks that we still ought to trust 
other sources of belief. It is just that we should, likewise, trust divine reve-
lation, given that our instincts would lead us to believe this as well.
The senses may and do deceive us, and yet we trust them from a secret 
instinct, so it need not be weakness or rashness, if upon a certain presenti-
ment of mind we trust to the fidelity of testimony offered for a Revelation. 
Again: we rely implicitly on our memory, and that, too, in spite of its being 
obviously unstable and treacherous .  .  . The same remarks apply to our 
assumption of the fidelity of our reasoning powers. Were it not for these 
instincts .  .  . the deceivableness of Senses, Memory, and Reason, would 
perplex us much .  .  . And so, as regards the matters of another, they who 
have not that instinctive apprehension of the Omnipresence of God and His 
unwearied and minute Providence which holiness and love create within 
us, must not be surprised to find that the evidence of Christianity does not 
perfect an office which was never intended for it.63
Faith was not meant to be supported by conclusive independent grounds. 
And if one insists that it should be, they, Newman thinks, are placing an 
undue epistemic burden on faith that even paradigm sources of posi-
tive epistemic status—e.g., perception, memory, and reasoning—cannot 
shoulder. What independent grounds can we provide for thinking that 
our perceptual experiences, for instance, accurately represent a mind inde-
pendent world to us? None, Newman thinks. Thus, since we are clearly 
within our epistemic rights to believe that there is an external world, so 
Newman maintains the same should be said of faith. Both kinds of beliefs 
are the result of doxastic instinct. Again, the interesting development in 
Newman that is absent in Aquinas is to commend the epistemic propri-
ety of faith on the basis of its isomorphism to core sources of knowledge. 
Beliefs that are the product of faith are arrived at on the basis of impulses 
that do not (and perhaps cannot) admit of a further justification just like 
perception, memory, and reason.64
62The Genius of John Henry Newman, 54.
63The Genius of John Henry Newman.
64One might point out that Newman appears to maintain that the doxastic instinct in the 
case of faith requires a certain measure of “holiness and love,” such that it is not natural in 
the sense that perception, memory and reason are natural. It’s rather doubtful that such a 
worry should have much purchase, however; for certain conditions must be met in order 
for the impulses of the other sources of knowledge to obtain in us as well. And one fact 
that cognitive psychology has made abundantly clear is that propensities to believe—for 
good or ill—can be heavily affected by volitional dispositions. (See, for instance, Kahneman’s 
Thinking Fast and Slow)
260 Faith and Philosophy
5. Conclusion
Aquinas’s conception of faith has looked irrational to many. This has been 
partly due to misunderstanding two notions critical to faith—credere and 
evidentia—as well as the specific sense in which faith employs the former 
and lacks the latter. And when we look closely at why Aquinas thinks 
we may trust that the articles of faith are true, we find a very interesting 
phenomenon that appears to have gone largely unnoticed—namely, an 
appeal to instinct. It is our inner impulse to accept the articles of faith that 
ultimately underwrites faith’s rationality. And while this idea is not much 
developed in Aquinas, we find an interesting reappearance of it in John 
Henry Newman, wherein a case is made for the impulse behind faith as 
being on a par with the doxastic impulses associated with other sources 
of knowledge.
The major point of contrast between Aquinas and Newman is that 
while Newman seems to maintain that the instinct involved in faith is 
inherent to human beings (even if in a qualified sense), Aquinas holds 
that it is divinely given. For Aquinas, faith is, on the one hand, not natural 
in virtue of it being an impulse furnished by God. Yet, on the other hand, 
it is natural in the sense that, once it is given, it amounts to just the sort 
of belief-forming propensity that we are warranted in relying on. That is 
to say, faith becomes just the kind of interior impulse to believe that we 
should obey. And it is the fact that faith has just such an impulse behind it 
that constitutes the critical epistemic ground for Aquinas.
Fort Lewis College
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